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GOVERNANCE NETWORKS:  
INTERLOCKING DIRECTORSHIPS OF CORPORATE AND NONPROFIT BOARDS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
An era of globalization brings greater interconnectedness and interdependence between 
previously separate groups and individuals. In Castells’ (2000) The rise of the network society, 
he emphasizes the ever increasing importance of networks as governance becomes more 
fluid in this global era.  Network theory is receiving greater attention in the literature and has 
been lauded as “an exceptionally powerful analytic tool” (Riles cited in Frankham, 2006, p. 
661). Evans (2001) has asserted that to further understand the potential of networks 
“detailed empirical research is now required” (p. 549).  Hence this article contributes to the 
literature about networks and governance, empirically and conceptually, using an analysis of 
inter-organizational networks of directors in one Australian state as the springboard.  
Our study draws on Alexander’s (1998; 2003; 2005) research on the growing nature of 
governance networks in Australia and examines connections between board directors of 
private companies and nonprofits in Western Australia (WA). Perth, its capital city, offers an 
interesting site for the study of this phenomenon of governance networks due to its relative 
isolation from other major cities in Australia and its status as a state with a booming mining 
economy. 
In WA, the dramatic growth in nonprofits has led to increasing interest by the government 
and academics in the composition and general decision-making of their boards. The first 
incorporated associations in WA were recorded in 1896 upon the passing of enabling 
legislation and steadily grew in numbers until about 30 years ago when dramatic growth 
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occurred. With this growth, greater pressure has been exerted on their regulatory framework 
(Huntly, 1996). In 2006, it was estimated that there were 15,260 active associations in WA 
with more than 100,000 Western Australians sitting on their boards (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2006-07). When the state government tabled its Associations Incorporation Bill in 
2006, Patrick Walker, Consumer Protection Commissioner, stated that “Community 
expectations of voluntary associations and the people who run them have changed in the past 
two decades as have the size and complexity of incorporated associations” (Department of 
Consumer Protection, 6 February 2007). As a result of the growing complexity of their 
operations, these nonprofit boards are increasingly inviting company directors on to their 
boards to assist them in negotiating their challenging environment. 
This article reports on phase one of a research project that empirically mapped the 
interconnectedness of board directors in the private and public sectors in WA and examined 
the wider implications of these networks. Phase two is a qualitative investigation of the roles 
and effectiveness of company directors on nonprofit boards. To our knowledge, no Australian 
studies have researched the linkages between corporate directors and nonprofit 
organizations and their effect on the governance of economic and social institutions. 
The remainder of this article describes the background literature on networks and 
governance; the approach to network analysis employed in this study; and the findings 
presented as governance network figures. It concludes with a discussion about the findings’ 
potential implications for building social capital and trust across key institutions in society. 
BACKGROUND: NETWORKS AND GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATIONS AND NONPROFITS 
Rhodes (1997) produced some of the significant early work on network theory. He 
characterized ‘interorganizational networks’ by: blurred boundaries between interdependent 
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public and private organizations; exchange of resources (money, authority, information, 
expertise) to achieve goals; interactions negotiated between participants on the basis of trust; 
and new accountability relationships. He also emphasised that in developing the concept of 
networks “the task has scarcely begun, in either theory or practice” (1997, p.  xiv). More 
recently, Fataar (2006) maintained that one of the strengths of network analysis is that it can 
accommodate both loose and tight structures (allowing simultaneously for fluidity and order), 
as well as focusing on both formal and informal interactions between private and public 
actors. In applying network theory to specific settings in the United Kingdom (UK), Ball and 
Exley focused on the generation and circulation of key ideas, networks which straddle 
different sectors and the flow of discourses (especially in relation to innovation and 
enterprise), thereby “providing solutions to intractable social problems” (2010, p. 151). 
Considine (2005) highlighted that networks are diverse in nature, with the strength, pattern 
and use made of network linkages varying widely, and that network activity between key 
actors can both help and hinder the processes and outcomes of organizations. Also relevant 
to this research, Considine maintains that “to adequately account for the way ideas, resources 
or decisions are influenced by these networks, we need to be able to map both the 
organizational and the personal [links] on to the same framework” (2005, p. 139).  
A few key studies over the past fifty years have described the cohesive interpersonal 
networks that interlock the economic, political and civil sectors of leadership in different 
countries. C. Wright Mills’ (1956) classic study of America’s top leaders found that they 
controlled key national decisions. Through membership network analysis, Domhoff (1998) 
discovered that individuals serving as directors on the same corporate boards formed 
interpersonal networks. In a comparative study of Australia, the United States (US), and 
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Western Germany, Higley et al. (1991) found the existence of densely connected circles of 
several hundred top leaders in each nation. Additionally, Unseem (1984), in a study of 
corporate directors in the US and UK, demonstrated the key role held by an inner circle of 
directors with interlocking directorships in leading corporations and nonprofit boards.  
Moore, Sobieraj, Whitt, Mayorova, and Beaulieu (2002) extended this type of analysis and 
found three trends which affected the nonprofit sector in the US: “(1) the increased size of 
the sector, (2) the changing structure of nonprofit organizations and (3) the growing 
interpenetration between the state, the economy, and civil society” (2002, p. 729). They 
noted a blurring of the boundaries between the state, the market and civil society. 
Consequently, nonprofit organizations frequently act as independent contractors for the state 
and have turned to market strategies in an effort to increase revenues. Moore et al. (2002) 
explored whether certain types of nonprofit organizations were more tightly integrated than 
others with business leaders and concluded that substantial linkages existed across all types 
of nonprofit organizations.  
In Australia, research studies have described networks between boards of directors 
(Alexander, 2003; Nicholson, Alexander and Kiel, 2004). Alexander (2003) confirmed the 
growing nature of these networks in a 20 year study that found their interpersonal networks 
in 1996 were broader, more cohesive and more densely connected than those in 1976. 
Using resource dependence theory and social network analysis, Nicholson et al. (2004), in 
comparing Australia and the US, mapped the role of directors in providing access to 
resources and measured the patterns of relationships and information flows between board 
directors. They found that the levels and reach of corporate network activity were roughly 
similar across the two countries. They suggested that interlocking directorates were likely to 
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be conduits for diffusing norms and managerial innovations and creating a convergence of 
viewpoints. A study in the US by Pusser, Slaughter and Thomas (2006) mapped the 
interlocking nature of university councils and governing bodies of corporations, using 
concepts and techniques from network theory. They noted the pressure on American 
universities to develop corporate models for their boards of trustees and to raise substantial 
amounts of income from private sources. The ability of university boards to raise funds and 
adopt corporate models would be aided by the fact that of the 662 university trustees on 
the boards of the 20 research universities they studied, there were 413 who were also 
members of corporate boards. They discovered that private universities in the US were 
more interconnected to the corporate world than public universities. They concluded that 
these networks need to be more extensively studied and theorized. 
Harris and Helfat (2007) focused on internal linkages between individual directors and 
their effect on board decision making. They suggested future research should: 1) identify 
the demographics of board members; 2) map the social network structure of board 
members; and 3) analyse the relationships between board member networks and board 
decision outcomes.  
Brown (2007) used Hillman and Dalziel’s (2003) concept of “board capital” to test 
empirically the competence of boards. Board capital consists of the expertise or human 
capital that board members have and their relational capital or social networks. His study 
recognized the importance of board capital in contributing to board performance but felt 
that more research on identifying the desirable competencies for nonprofit board members 
would be very useful. Van Slyke (2003) called attention to the importance of networks in 
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New York state nonprofit organisations when funding was under attack. He found that 
board members used their contacts with public officials to restore funding. 
Provan, Fish and Sydow (2007) turned their gaze externally with a review of inter-
organizational networks. They proposed that studying whole networks has important 
implications for individual network members, firms, and nonprofit organizations. They 
concluded that previous research on whole networks has left many important questions 
unanswered and that researchers should seek to understand how whole networks operate, 
how they are best structured and managed.  
Thus, the literature reveals multiple calls for more research on governance networks and 
emphasizes the need for empirical work. The analysis in this article is based on looking at 
individual directors and not at organizations per se so this network analysis differs from 
some others (Provan and Milward, 1995; Alter and Hage, 1993) that researched the 
effectiveness of networks of organizations. The purpose of these studies was to determine 
whether integrated systems of community agencies could provide services to clients better 
than individual agencies or government. In contrast, our work centers on individuals’ 
networks serving on the boards of nonprofit organizations and corporations. Our long-term 
aim is to assess the influence of corporate directors on nonprofit boards and the degree to 
which governance of these boards is altered through corporate directors serving on these 
boards. In this article, we are investigating the governance networks between for-profit and 
nonprofit boards, referring to the linkages between individuals sitting on governing bodies 
and the social networks that are created between these individuals. 
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METHOD: NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Our research draws on the work of Alexander (1998; 2003; 2005) and uses Borgatti’s 
(2011) social network analysis software (NetDraw) to ascertain the extent to which there 
were overlapping directorships between corporations and nonprofit organizations in 2006 in 
the relatively isolated state of WA. We hypothesized that the interlocking nature of the 
directors would be denser in Perth than in other Australian capitals due to its distance from 
other major cities. This latter consideration could be substantiated with further research. 
To obtain the names of directors on company and nonprofit boards in WA, research was 
undertaken in three stages. First, we drew up a list of companies headquartered in Perth that 
were on the list of the Top 300 companies on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in 2006. 
Our seed group consisted of all WA companies that appeared on the Top 300 companies. 
There were 41 companies on this list that were headquartered in Perth. To protect the 
anonymity of directors, no individual names were used; instead lines were drawn between 
organizations having common directors. Second, we obtained the names of the 231 directors 
of these companies from their webpages. In their profiles, these directors listed the other WA 
companies (outside the Top 300 ASX) and 26 nonprofits in WA on which they served. Third, 
we drew up a list of nonprofits registered in WA as incorporated associations and obtained 
from their webpages the directors on their boards. Through a cross-checking exercise of these 
directors and the boards they served on, we obtained the raw data that was entered into an 
Excel spread sheet and then inserted into NetDraw.  
In terms of deciding which nonprofits should be included in our study, we drew on Huntly’s 
(1996) eight categories of incorporated associations: 1) religious and educational bodies; 2)  
literary, scientific, artistic and musical bodies; 3) sporting, recreation and amusement 
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societies; 4) community, social, and cultural groups; 5) political, historical, heritage and 
environmental protection groups; 6) breeding, agricultural and horticultural societies; 7) 
trade, professional, industry and alumni associations; 8) health services, hospitals, aged care 
and retirement homes and senior citizen associations. We then decided to eliminate three 
nonprofit groups that would have obvious links to corporate directors: Australian Institute of 
Company Directors, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and Western Australian Motor 
Industry Foundation.  
NetDraw allows for a number of analytical procedures to be undertaken to determine the 
kinds of shared relationships among the board directors of organisations entered into the 
software program. By using Freeman’s (1977) measure of ‘betweenness’, we could determine 
the degree of interlocking directorships that existed among WA companies in the ASX Top 300 
and nonprofits.  
The ideas about social networks, and identifying who are the central actors, comes from 
sociological studies of human communication which date back to studies under the direction 
of Bavelas (1948) at the Group Networks Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology in the late 1940s. Identifying the number of links there were between these 
actors became an important structural attribute of these social network studies because it 
identified how important a person was within a social network.  
Those directors with a high degree of ‘betweenness’ or interlocking connectedness were 
“in the thick of things” and a person who is in such a position would begin to see himself or 
herself as a major channel of information. According to Freeman (1978/79), they would have 
the sense of being in the mainstream of information flow in the network. A person with a low 
degree of ‘betweenness’ would be isolated from direct involvement with most of the others 
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in the network, and relatively cut off from active participation in the on-going communication 
process.  
FINDINGS 
The findings are presented as two network figures to visually represent the measure of 
‘betweenness’ of board directors. The degree to which more than one person from a board 
sits on another company board or nonprofit organization is represented by thicker lines. 
Figure 1 depicts the interpenetrating directorships of WA’s ASX Top 300 companies (red 
squares) with other Australian ASX Top 300 companies (blue circles); and Figure 2, the 
interpenetration of directorships between the ASX Top 300 companies (red squares) and 
nonprofit organizations in WA (green triangles). 
       
Of the 41 WA companies listed on the ASX Top 300, 22 of their directors had connections 
with 51 companies, 30 of which were in the Eastern states. Three companies had the largest 
squares: WA Newspapers, Wesfarmers and Woodside. Two of these have the most 
interlocking directorships: WA Newspapers (10 directors, five from WA companies and five 
from Eastern states companies) and Wesfarmers (9 directors, two from WA companies and 
seven from Eastern states companies). Woodside was the next largest square with six links 
(five Eastern states and one WA). The next level of squares included Iluka (four Eastern states 
and one WA), Great Southern Plantations (four WA and one Eastern state) and Oceana Gold 
(two WA and one Eastern state Bank).   
Our findings parallel those of Alexander’s (1998) study of the largest 250 Australian 
companies in 1992. He found that there was a concentration and centralization of big 
business with the largest public companies at its core. In our network analysis, four of the six 
 
 
Figure 1.Western Australia Companies in ASX Top 300 with Links to Australian Companies 
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WA companies with the largest squares or greatest interconnectedness were in the top 10 
based on their total assets in millions of dollars in 2006. Two (WA Newspapers, Wesfarmers) 
of the three central companies were diversified in their holdings; the third one, Woodside, 
was in the resources sector. Wesfarmers and Woodside were by far the wealthiest companies 
with more than three times the total assets of any of the others listed in the top 57 
companies. Two other companies, Iluka and Oceana Gold were also in the resources sector 
and Great Southern was a diversified agribusiness investment company. It is interesting to 
note that five of the six companies had directors with links to either WA Newspapers or 
Wesfarmers. Oceana Gold was connected to other resource companies and to the National 
Australia Bank which was the most central of the Australian ASX companies with connections 
to both Wesfarmers and Woodside in WA and Qantas Airways, nationally. Other resource 
companies formed their own connections outside the centrality of the big companies. 
 Figure 2 shows the links between directors in WA companies in the ASX Top 300 with 
links to WA’s nonprofit organizations and the links that these nonprofits have with each 
other. Table 1 shows the acronyms for these nonprofit organizations that include health 
funds, hospitals, cultural, heritage and sporting organizations, foundations, private colleges 
and universities. There are 18 nonprofits in Figure 3 and all of them have links with at least 
one of the 16 ASX Top 300 companies. Some had more than one link (thicker lines) producing 
35 nodes in total. Great Southern Plantations had the most links, followed by the Home 
Building Society, then WA Newspapers and Wesfarmers.  There are two nonprofits with the 
greatest number of links: The University of Western Australia (six company directors and five 
nonprofit directors) was the largest triangle followed by Perth’s International Arts Festival 
(four company directors and three nonprofit directors). As is evident in Figure 2, most 
 Figure 2.Western Australia Companies in ASX Top 300 with Links 
to Other Western Australia Nonprofits 
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nonprofits have a mixture of links with companies and other nonprofits. The exceptions are 
two of the smaller triangles that had links with companies but not with other nonprofits: WA 
Opera Company linked with four companies and Hospital Benefit Fund linked with two 
companies. 
TABLE 1 
Acronyms of the Nonprofit Organizations with links to Top companies in WA 
AIEPerth Australian Institute of Energy Perth 
ARACY Australian Research Alliance for Children and Youth 
CPHA City of Perth Heritage Appeal 
EON EON Foundation 
FDI Future Directions International 
HBF Hospital Benefit Fund 
PCYC Parkerville Children and Youth Care 
PIAF Perth International Arts Festival 
Scotch College Scotch College 
Silver Chain Silver Chain Nursing Association 
St John of God HC St John of God Health Care 
Tennis West Tennis West 
UWA Senate University of Western Australia Senate 
WACF Western Australian Community Foundation 
WAMF Western Australian Museum Foundation 
WAOC Western Australia Opera Company 
WASO Western Australia Symphony Orchestra 
Youth Focus Youth Focus 
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A longitudinal study of the connections among companies and between companies and 
nonprofits would reveal whether there is a trend toward greater interpenetration as 
Alexander (2003) discovered with Australian companies. However, there is no research, to our 
knowledge, which identifies the same phenomenon for the nonprofit and private sectors.  
Like Alexander’s (2005) description of Brisbane’s networks as a ‘small world’, Perth is also a 
‘small world’ where prominent citizens sitting on the boards of big companies and community 
organizations are confined to a relatively distinct group of well-known directors. The 
affiliation networks they create are simultaneously the links between organizations and 
between their directors. By studying these links in a city like Brisbane, Alexander (2005) 
suggests that it can be the beginning of a community-power study to identify decision-making 
elites. The key connectors are people with multiple memberships across a range of boards. In 
Alexander’s study (2003) of the 250 largest Australian companies, he saw what he called the 
‘collectivization’ of Australian business, where the interpersonal networks became broader, 
more cohesive and more connected and more concentrated in Australia than in the US with a 
much smaller and more powerful circle of investors working in a smaller capital market. From 
this study of WA companies headquartered in Perth, a city similar in size to Brisbane, the 
individuals in the social networks between companies and nonprofits are likely to form its 
power elite.  
From these figures that show the names of the companies as nodes, it is impossible to see 
their individual composition. However, one of the striking statistics from our study is the 
dearth of females on these boards. In this group of 231 corporate directors only 14 directors 
or 6 percent were females.  Not only is there a tight circle of elites in WA but most of these 
are males.  
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Moore and Whitt (2000) found similar results in Louisville (US) when they researched the 
most influential positions in nonprofit organizations. They deemed those who sat on three 
boards simultaneously as the Big Linkers who made up the inner circle of nonprofit board 
members and built up their ‘board capital’ to have more power in the community. They found 
that those boards with high budgets and those seen as most prestigious were typically led by 
men who found they were able to forge valuable social and business ties through these board 
memberships.  
Of growing concern in Australia is the lack of women on boards and WA has the worst 
record of any of the states with nearly 70 percent of its companies without any female 
directors. According to the Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency (2008), 
women held only 8.3 percent of board director positions compared with countries like US 
(14.8%), Canada (13.0%) and UK (11%).  A question to pursue in phase two of this study is 
whether obtaining positions on high profile nonprofit boards might lead to directorships on 
corporate boards through developing ‘board capital’ and the trust of these mainly men who 
serve on both boards. 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
Network theory can be a powerful analytic tool in researching governance, especially as it 
can identify both formal and informal interactions between private and public actors (Fataar, 
2006), when the blurring of the public-private divide is a characteristic of this global era. The 
findings of our network analysis show how board directors of top corporations in the 
relatively isolated state of WA are interconnected with each other and with the boards of 
nonprofit organizations through corporate actors holding multiple directorships. Dense 
governance networks – within the corporate sector and between corporations and nonprofits 
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– potentially provide a conduit for the flow of information, advice and emotional support for 
risk taking (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003), all of which are ascribed greater importance in a 
rapidly changing global knowledge era.  
Our findings to date raise wider implications for governance networks that should be of 
interest beyond this particular research site. While we are not intending to generalize, these 
wider questions are likely to provide ‘food for thought’ in other contexts.  
Advantages of Corporate-Nonprofit Board Networks 
Governance networks between corporate and nonprofit boards could be particularly 
critical for nonprofit organizations as they increasingly have to compete for scarce funds at a 
time when governments are trying to reduce the reliance of nonprofits on state revenue. 
Pusser, et al. (2006) found that universities were reaching out to company directors to assist 
them with their more complex external environments and for additional resources. In the UK, 
Deloitte (2011) found that 100 of UK’s largest businesses collectively made community 
investments of more than £1.4 billion to nonprofits.  
For nonprofits, interlocking directorships with top companies can also be a source of 
human capital, as corporate directors can bring knowledge from the commercial world to 
improve the effectiveness of nonprofit  governance. In a study of business influences on the 
nonprofit sector, Griggs (2003) found that as governance becomes more complex and 
multidimensional, nonprofits need to balance their social goals with commercial realities.  
It is important to recognize, though, that the benefits of corporate-nonprofit interlocking 
board directorships are not confined to the nonprofit sector as, for example, corporations can 
stand to gain reputational and marketing benefits from their work with nonprofit 
organizations, in particular demonstrating good ‘corporate citizenship’. Therefore, at an initial 
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glance corporate-nonprofit board interlocks might be seen as a win-win situation for both 
types of organizations; however, interlocking directorships might also have the potential to be 
counterproductive for good governance. 
Disadvantages of Corporate-Nonprofit Board Networks 
Considine (2005) reminds us that networks between key actors can both help and hinder 
the processes of organizations. Some of the challenges arising from corporate-nonprofit 
governance networks are worthy of investigation. First, the existence of interlocking board 
directorships between corporate and nonprofit organizations does not necessarily guarantee 
the flow of information across these sectors. As Pusser et al. (2006) emphasize, we also need 
to ask “what flows across the links?” before we can begin to understand the implications of 
governance networks.  
A second issue is the extent to which any knowledge that does flow along governance 
networks can be successfully transferred from one context to another. Two inherent dangers 
emerge from the uncritical transfer of knowledge between different boards. One is the 
possibility of greater convergence of governance structures and processes across different 
types of organizations, which may well undermine creativity and risk-taking (Nicholson et al., 
2004), which is commonly held as crucial for the development of a global knowledge 
economy/society. Another is the potential for a clash of cultures within boards, between 
directors who bring different experiences to the table. For instance, if corporate directors on 
nonprofit boards do not fully understand the nonprofit’s goals or the greater difficulty of 
measuring long term non-economic outcomes (in contrast to the relative ease of measuring 
the economic ‘bottom line’), these corporate directors could undermine the effectiveness of 
achieving a nonprofit’s long term social goals. 
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A final issue is that the economic-oriented ideology of corporations and social-oriented 
ideology of nonprofits are not only different but they are also not equal; there are 
embedded power differentials between these ideologies. Arguably, economic priorities have 
taken precedence over social concerns as globalization has accelerated during the last 30 
years. The near hegemonic status of neo-liberal ideology – particularly marginalizing social 
justice ideology – suggests that where corporate and nonprofit interests collide in 
governance networks, it is more likely that economic concerns will prevail. Vidovich (2007) 
argues that insufficient attention to power relationships is a weakness of network theory in 
general, and that while networks have the potential to democratise governance processes, 
there is also a need to bring more critical perspectives to examining the potential role of governance 
networks in exacerbating social inequalities. 
Social Capital and Trust 
Building social capital and trust across different types of institutions in society could be a 
potential benefit of these interlocking directorships. The concept of trust is receiving 
increasing attention in the literature. Tierney (2006) offered an extended analysis of the 
characteristics of trust, building on the earlier work of sociologists Coleman and Bourdieu, 
explaining that social capital is the foundation for trust.  Where social capital is “the actual or 
potential resources developed within a network of more or less institutionalized relationships 
of mutual acquaintances” (2006: 83). Tierney constructs a ‘grammar of trust’ consisting of 
nine frames: a repeated interaction; a dynamic process; an end; an exchange; utilizing faith; 
taking risk; an ability; a rational choice; and a cultural construction. To briefly elaborate, trust 
develops over repeated interactions between parties, but conversely, a single interaction can 
cause trust to be destroyed. It is a dynamic process through which complexity can be reduced 
because it can enable expectations about what will occur. It can also be an end, in a cyclical 
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manner whereby the process of trusting can generate an outcome of more trust. It is basically 
an exchange or a reciprocal relationship between parties which goes beyond a particular 
event and can be seen as faith that another party will fulfill their part of an agreement. Trust 
involves taking a risk that another party will do as expected. It is an ability that is learned over 
time rather than being innate. The last two frames constitute an overarching language to 
conceptualize trust, with rational choice focusing on how individuals align themselves to a 
structure, whereas a cultural construction conceives of more fluid social organizations.  
Along a similar vein, Van Houtte (2007: 826) synthesized a definition of trust as 
“confidence that expectations will be met” and delineated five dimensions of trust as 
competence, honesty, openness, reliability and benevolence. Hoang and Antoncic argued that 
“trust also affects the depth and richness of exchange relations” (2003: 170), especially when 
it comes to the flow of information in governance networks. Pusser et al. (2006: 750) argue 
that interlocking directorships “constitute a form of organizational social capital” that 
increases trust between board members and across boards, and that the board members’ 
familiarity and experience with one another in multiple settings increases trust. 
In essence, building social capital and trust can help to facilitate effective governance 
networks between and within different types of organizations. Equally though, when trust is 
undermined, governance is likely to become less effective and potentially the source of 
negative consequences (Vidovich and Currie, 2011). Thus, trust is a central concept in turning 
interlocking governance into long term assets for private and nonprofit organizations. We 
would hypothesize that building economic and social capital in concert with each other will 
optimize social cohesion in challenging times, when research is pointing to globalization 
exacerbating the gap between advantaged and disadvantaged, within and between countries.  
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Further Research 
This study was limited to a particular Australian state at a particular point in time. 
Although we need to begin with localized patterns of interlocks to gain depth of 
understanding about governance networks in situ, further research could extend to 
different contexts. The isolation of WA along with its high reliance on mining as the 
foundation of its economy (in contrast to a more diversified economy) may well heighten 
the density of interlocking directorships among companies and also between these 
companies and nonprofits. Comparative research on governance networks in different 
jurisdictions is required to develop broader understandings about context-specific variations 
in governance patterns. Furthermore, longitudinal studies are required to investigate 
changes in board interlocks over time. Thus, expanding research to different places and 
times would provide a stronger foundation for theory building.  
The next phase of our research examines in more detail the membership and influence of 
corporate directors on nonprofit boards. The project will provide greater insights into the 
question of ‘what flows across the links?’ of governance networks (Pusser et al., 2006). 
Through case studies of nonprofit boards that include corporate directors, we can ascertain 
the type of intra-board relationships that occur between these private and public actors, the 
kind of influences the corporate directors bring and their impact on nonprofit governance 
practices. Harris and Helfat (2007) suggested that a board is a social network unto itself and 
that intra-board relationships influence critical decisions for organizations. Thus studying 
intra-board relationships would help understand why boards make the decisions they do. To 
conclude, we echo the call of Hoang and Antoncic (2003) for more longitudinal and 
qualitative research on governance networks as well as more theory building. 
 Governance networks 
19 
 
REFERENCES 
Alexander, M. “Big business and directorship networks: the centralization of economic 
power in Australia.” Journal of Sociology, 1998, 34(2), 107-122. 
Alexander, M. “Boardroom networks among Australian company directors, 1976 and 1996: 
The impact of investor capitalism.” Journal of Sociology, 2003, 39(3), 231-251. 
Alexander, M. “Brisbane's Small World.” Griffith Review, 2005, 3, 50-55. 
Alter, C., and Hage, J. Organizations Working Together. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. Not-For-Profit organizations, Australia. Cat. No. 8106.0, 
Canberra: ABS, 2006-07. 
Bavelas, A. “A mathematical model for group structures.” Human Organization, 1948, 7, 16-
30.  
Borgatti, S. NetDraw Software. Lexington, Kentucky: Analytic Technologies, 2011. 
Brown, W. A. “Board Development Practices and Competent Board Members: Implications 
for Performance.” Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 2007, 17(3), 301-317. 
Castells, M. The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000. 
Considine, M. Making Public Policy. Cambridge: Polity, 2005. 
Deloitte. “Emerging partnership models between business and the third sector: How 
charities can reap the benefits of corporate responsibility programmes.” London: The 
Creative Studio. Retrieved September 19, 2011 from 
http:www.deloitte.com/view/en_GB/uk/about/community-
investment/93320cad6bf9e210VgnVCM3000001c56f00aRCRD.htm 
 Governance networks 
20 
 
Department of Consumer and Employment Protection. Incorporated associations overhaul: 
Associations Incorporation Bill 2006. Perth: Government of Western Australia Printers, 
2007. 
Domhoff, G. W. Who rules America? Power and Politics in the Year 2000. Mountain View, 
CA: Mayfield, 1998. 
Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency (EOWA). Fact Sheet: 2008 EOWA 
Australian Census of Women in Leadership. Sydney: EOWA, 2008. 
Evans, M. “Understanding dialectics in policy network analysis.” Political Studies, 2001, 49, 
542-550. 
Fataar, A. “Policy networks in calibrated political terrain.” Journal of Education Policy, 2006, 
21(6), 641-659. 
Frankham, J. “Network utopias and alternative entanglements for educational research and 
practice”. Journal of Education Policy, 2006, 21(6), 661-677. 
Freeman, L. C. “A set of measures of centrality based on betweenness.” Sociometry, 1977, 
40, 35-41. 
Freeman, L. C. “Centrality in social networks: Conceptual clarification.” Social Networks, 
1978-79, 1, 215-239. 
Griggs, H. E. “Corporatisation of the not-for-profit sector: Strategic planning and organizational 
performance in disability-based organizations.” International Journal of Disability, 
Development and Education, 2003, 50(2), 197-220. 
Harris, D. A., and Helfat, C.E. “The board as a social network”. Journal of Management 
Inquiry, 2007, 16(3), 228-237. 
 Governance networks 
21 
 
Higley, J., Hoffmann-Lange, U., Kadushin, C. and Moore, G. “Elite integration in stable 
democracies.” European Sociological Review, 1991, 77, 35-48. 
Hillman, A. J., and Dalziel, T. “Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency 
and Resource Dependence Perspectives.” Academy of Management Review, 2003, 23, 
383-396. 
Hoang, H. & Antoncic, B. “Network-based research in entrepreneurship: A critical review.” 
Journal of Business Venturing, 2003, 18, 165-187. 
Huntly, C. T. “A Century of Incorporated Associations in Western Australia, 1896-1996.” 
Unpublished Paper. Perth: Curtin University of Technology, 1996. 
Mills, C. Wright. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. 
Moore, G., Sobieraj, S., Whitt, J. A., Mayorova, O., and Beaulieu, D. “Elite interlocks in three 
U.S. sectors: Nonprofit, corporate, and government.” Social Science Quarterly, 2002, 
83(3), 726-744. 
Moore, G., and Whitt, J. A. “Gender and networks in a local voluntary-sector elite,” 
Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 2000, 11(4): 
309-328. 
Nicholson, G. J., Alexander, M., and Kiel, G. C. “Defining the social capital of the board of 
directors: An exploratory study.” Journal of the Australian and New Zealand Academy of 
Management, 2004, 10(1), 54-72.  
Provan, K. G., and Milward, H. T. “A preliminary theory of interorganizational network 
effectiveness: A comparative study of four community mental health systems.” 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 1995, 40(1), 1-33. 
 Governance networks 
22 
 
Provan, K.G., Fish, A., and Sydow, J. “Interorganizational networks at the network level: A 
review of the empirical literature on whole networks.” Journal of Management, 2007, 33, 
479-516. 
Pusser, B., Slaughter, S., and Thomas, S. L. “Playing the Board Game: An Empirical Analysis of 
University Trustee and Corporate Board Interlocks.” Journal of Higher Education, 2006, 
77(5), 747-775. 
Rhodes R. “Foreword.” In W. Kickert, E. Klijn and J. Koppenjan (eds.), Managing Complex 
Networks. London: Sage, 1997. 
Tierney, W. Trust and the Public Good, New York: Peter Lang, 2006.  
Unseem, M. The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise of Business Political Activity in 
the US and UK. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984. 
Van Slyke, D. M. “The mythology of privatization in contracting for social services.” Public 
Administration Review, 2003, 63(3), 296-315. 
Vidovich, L. “Removing policy from its pedestal: Some theoretical framings and practical 
possibilities.” Educational Review, 2007, 59(3), 285-298.  
Vidovich, L., and Currie, J. “Governance and trust in higher education.” Studies in Higher 
Education, 2011, 36(1), 43-56. 
